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Abstract
This article models a two-period overlapping generations economy in the steady state
where the realization of the quantity/quality number of children depends on an initial invest-
ment in children and on a random shock. It shows that the implementation of the first-best
allocation, in which the effort level is publicly observable, requires a subsidy on the invest-
ment in children. There should also be full insurance with respect to second-period con-
sumption and pensions must be invariant to the number of children. On the other hand,
when investment is unobservable and one cannot subsidize it, the full insurance property
goes away. In this case, pensions must be linked positively to the number of children. (JEL
codes: H55, J13)
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1 Introduction
A number of economists have recently advocated a policy of linking pen-
sion benefits (or contributions) to individuals’ fertility choices.1 The
reason for this is that, with a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security
system, the higher the number of children, the higher will be the available
tax revenues (levied on the children when they grow up) to finance the
pensions of the retired population. With all parents sharing the benefits
associated with their own and every other parents having more children
(the extra tax revenues their action generates), there is a positive exter-
nality in the system. This externality, if not corrected, implies that the
equilibrium number of children in a decentralized system would be
suboptimal.
A second and related issue concerns the ‘quality’ of children and their
human capital accumulation through educational decisions of the parents.
The externality here arises because the rate of return of a PAYGO system
depends not just on the fertility rate, but also on productivity growth.
1 See, among others, Van Groezen et al. (2000, 2003), Bental (1989), Kolmar (1997), Abio
et al. (2004), Fenge and Meier (2005).
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The more productive the children, the higher will be their ability to pro-
duce and to pay taxes. This reinforces the public good nature of a family’s
child-rearing activities.2
The counter argument to such a policy is that one does not really know
what truly determines fertility, and what accounts for the observed evo-
lution in fertility behavior. In particular, it is clear that no one can fully
control fertility. Miscarriage, multiple births and plain infertility imply
that the number of children the parents intend to have does not necessarily
coincide with the actual number of children they will have. Similarly, one
cannot deterministically determine the future earning abilities of children
simply by investing in their education and training. Given these realities,
linking benefits to the number and/or some measure of the quality of
children opens the parents to undesirable and uncontrollable risks.
The underlying problem with such a policy then, at least in case of
identical individuals, is one of moral hazard.3 The parents’ effort level
in having and raising productive children is not publicly observable.
Nor can it be inferred from the outcome, due to the inherent randomness
in the process. Under this circumstance, the pension system provides
insurance against the fertility and educational achievements risks. When
individuals differ in child-rearing ability, or in the taste for children, the
problem will include a dimension of adverse selection as well. The actual
number of children will then be determined by effort, child-rearing ability,
preferences, and a random component. Again, risk sharing through a
PAYGO pension scheme may be desirable.
This article attempts to shed light on these contrasting views. The main
question is if one should fully ensure parents against the shocks in fertility
and educational attainment of their children by offering everyone the same
pension, or if one should link the pensions to the number of children.
If the latter is the answer, one would also want to know how.
We posit a model which allows for the externality that different parents
impose on one another (through their decisions on how many children to
have and how much to invest in them). Now the key distinguishing elem-
ent between quantity and quality decisions is one of timing. The number of
children born is known quite early; the quality of children (i.e. their future
earning capacity) is determined much later. To account for both features,
one needs a model with at least three periods of decision making. This
makes the problem far more complicated than necessary.4 We thus do not
2 On this, see Cigno et al. (2003).
3 Sinn (2004) has studied this issue in a different setting.
4 Cigno and Luporini (2003) have such a model; however, they do not optimize over tax
instruments.
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specifically distinguish between fertility and investment decisions. Instead,
we lump the investments in quantity and quality together as if one decision
determines both. This simplifies the modeling substantially by allowing us
to concentrate on a setting with two periods of decision making (as
opposed to three5). In so doing, we use the concept of number of children
in efficiency units that is widely used in growth theory.
We model a two-period overlapping generations economy in the steady
state where the realization of the quantity/quality number of children
depends on an initial investment in children and on a random shock.
Individuals are alike ex-ante. Given the emphasis on quality, we assume
that the number of children is observed late in the first period so that the
first-period consumption cannot vary with the number of children. The
second-period consumption, on the other hand, can be adjusted according
to one’s number of children. We assume away all financial markets: the
only potential mechanisms for transfer of resources to the future in the
economy are arrangements between parents and children whereby children
help their retired parents with the expectation that their own children
would help them, and a PAYGO public pension system. The young
divide their income between consumption in the first period and invest-
ment in children. To do this, they maximize their expected utility at the
beginning of the first period. The old consume their fixed income, plus any
additional transfers that they may receive (from their children or the
government).
We first characterize the laissez faire equilibrium of this model in the
absence of private pension plans, as well as when there exists a
within-family pension scheme consisting of direct transfers between the
young and their retired parents. Next, we characterize the first-best allo-
cation in which the effort level is publicly observable. We show that under
this circumstance, there should be full insurance with respect to second-
period consumption, and pensions must be invariant to the number of
children. We also show that implementation requires a subsidy on
the investment in children. On the other hand, when investment is unob-
servable and one cannot subsidize it, the full insurance property goes
away. In this case, pensions must be linked positively to the number of
children.
In this article, we have deliberately kept the presentation simple. In a
companion paper (Cremer et al. (2006)), we have allowed for private
savings and we have assumed that the number of children is observed
5 Three periods are needed to truly account for the distinction between quantity and qual-
ity. However, this makes the presentation of the issues more complicated than necessary
for the purpose at hand. See, on this, Cremer et al. (2011).
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early in the first period so that the first period consumption could vary
with it. Also in this article we assume homogeneity of parents in child
rearing and in tastes for children. Introducing heterogeneity matters
because it introduces a realistic element of redistribution in the picture,
but again it complicates the presentation.6
2 The model
We model the steady-state of a two-period overlapping generations econ-
omy. All individuals are alike ex-ante. They receive an exogenous level of
income in both periods of their lives. The second-period income is ‘suffi-
ciently smaller’ than the first so that the individuals would always want to
transfer resources to the future if they can. Preferences depend positively
on consumption in the first period, c, consumption in the second period, d,
and the number of children one produces as well as the ‘quality’ of the
children one brings up. The quantity/quality mix of children has two
possible realizations: n1 or n2 with n2> n1.
7 The actual realization of
ni (i¼ 1, 2) depends on an initial investment in children, k, to increase
the number of children and to enhance their quality, and on some
random shock. Thus, when a parent invests k, he will have n2 (in terms
of quality) children with probability (k) where 0(k) 1 and 0(k)>0
(00(k)<0 and (0)>0). It is plain that the probability of having n1 chil-
dren is given by 1(k).
The only potential mechanisms for transfer of resources to the future in
this economy are a possible arrangement between parents and children
whereby children help their retired parents with the expectation that their
own children would help them, and a PAYGO public pension system.8
The young divide their income, y, between consumption in the first period,
c, and investment in children, k. They would do that by maximizing their
expected utility at the beginning of the first period. The quality of children
are determined at the end of the first period. The old consume di which is
equal to their fixed income, s, plus any additional transfers that they may
receive. To keep the model simple, assume that preferences over c, di, and
ni are represented by an additive utility function. Consequently, at
the beginning of the first period, the expected utility of the young
6 On this question see Cremer et al. (2008) See also Gahvari (2009) for a survey on the
relation between fertility and pensions stressing the issues of adverse selection and moral
hazard.
7 One should think of ni as being measured in ‘efficiency units’.
8 In a related paper (Cremer et al. 2006), we consider a storage technology (fixed interest
rate) as an alternative channel for old-age provision.
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(i.e. future parents) is written as
U ¼ uðcÞ þ 1 ðkÞhðn1Þ þ vðd1Þþ ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ; ð1Þ
where u(), h(), and v() are strictly concave functions.9
2.1 Laissez faire
In a two-period overlapping generations model, one cannot make binding
contracts with one’s children to help them at retirement in return for them
(i.e. the children) being helped by their own children. Under this circum-
stance, the only source of consumption when one is old is one’s own
second-period exogenous income. Consequently, all retired persons,
regardless of the number of children they have, will consume the same
amount of resources. That is,
d1 ¼ d2 ¼ s:
The young determine their level of investment in children by max-
imizing
U ¼ uðcÞ þ vðsÞ þ 1 ðkÞhðn1Þ þ ðkÞhðn2Þ
subject to
cþ k ¼ y: ð2Þ
The first-order condition for this problem yields
Proposition 1 Consider the steady state of an overlapping generations
economy with no capital and no means of storage. Assume parents can
have either n1 or n2 children (n2> n1) with probabilities 1(k) and (k),
where k denotes investment in children. The laissez-faire allocation is char-
acterized by Equation (2) and
0ðkÞhðn2Þ  hðn1Þ
u0ðcÞ ¼ 1: ð3Þ
9 In this article, we posit that n can either reflect the number of children or the ‘quality’ of a
fixed number of children. Our specification is not suitable to explicitly account for a
trade-off between quality and quantity of children. To introduce such a feature, one
would have to consider a more specific timing assumption: first, fertility choice and
then educational choice, acknowledging that both processes have random elements (see
Cigno and Luporini (2003) and Cigno et al. (2003).
336 CESifo Economic Studies, 57, 2/2011
H. Cremer et al.
Equation (3) tells us that k is determined in such a way as to equalize the
young’s expected gain in lifetime utility due to a dollar increase in k (from
having more children), with the utility loss due to the one dollar reduction
in c (the first-period consumption). Put differently, k is optimal when the
young’s ‘marginal rate of substitution’ between k and c is equal to the
price of k relative to c (namely, one). Note that the individual cannot
smooth his intertemporal consumption by sacrificing c for d. However,
he will have identical second-period consumption levels across the two
states of higher and lower quality of children in both periods.
2.2 Private transfers between parents and children
Assume now that we have a within-family pension scheme consisting of
direct transfers between the young and their retired parents.10 Each indi-
vidual would, in the steady state, give T dollars to his parent in the first
period and receives T dollars from each of his children in the second
period. This changes the budget constraint of the first period to
c ¼ y k T: ð4Þ
Similarly, the second period consumption will change to
di ¼ sþ Tni i ¼ 1; 2: ð5Þ
Observe that according to (5), more children imply more second-period
consumption. Consequently, in the presence of a within-family pension
scheme, there would be another reason for wanting to have more children
(and thus investing in them).
The young will now maximize (1) subject to the constraints (4) and (5).
To characterize the solution in this case, substitute for c and di from (4)
and (5) into (1) and then maximize the resulting equation with respect to k
and T. Simplifying the first-order conditions, we have
Proposition 2 Consider the steady state of an overlapping generations
economy in the presence of a within-family pension plan. The equilibrium
allocation is characterized by Equations (4) and (5), and
0ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ
u0ðcÞ ¼ 1; ð6Þ

1 ðkÞn1v0ðd1Þ þ ðkÞn2v0ðd2Þ
u0ðcÞ ¼ 1: ð7Þ
10 This is to serve as a benchmark. We ignore the question of how parents and children
agree and adhere to this arrangement.
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Equation (6) is similar to (3) under laissez-faire. As before, it tells us that
the optimal level of k equalizes the young’s expected gain in lifetime utility
due to a dollar increase in k, with the utility loss due to the one dollar
reduction in c. Note, however, that the gain now also includes the differ-
ence between v(d2) and v(d1). Equation (7) is the optimality condition we
attain by allowing for transfer of resources across time through the family
pension plan. This tells us that the individual sets T to equalize the
expected utility gain in the second-period consumption to the utility loss
in the first-period consumption. These equations indicate that the individ-
ual optimizes his intertemporal consumption profile, which he can affect
through both T and k. What the individual cannot do, however, is to
smooth his consumption profile across the two states of higher and
lower number of children. Specifically, we have d2> d1 [see Equation (5)].
3 First best
Assume now that the government observes and fully controls all consump-
tion levels so that it can effect a first-best allocation. The government’s
objective is to maximize the steady-state utility of a representative indi-
vidual. This corresponds to the maximization of a concave social welfare
function defined over the utilities of all present and future generations.11
Normalize the total number of the current young, at their given quality
type, at one. This implies that we have 1=nðkÞ current old persons (mea-
sured in the same efficiency units) where
nðkÞ ¼ 1 ðkÞn1 þ ðkÞn2: ð8Þ
The aggregate resources of the economy is then equal to
yþ s
nðkÞ :
This should finance the aggregate expenditures in the economy, and we
have the following resource constraint:
yþ s




1 ðkÞd1 þ ðkÞd2
i
: ð9Þ
The problem of the government is to maximize the steady-state utility
(1) subject to the economy’s resource constraint. It is summarized by the
11 In our setup, there will be no transitional generations. The move to a new steady state is
instantaneous. It will also become clear later that the first-best policy would improve the
welfare of the current old generation.
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Lagrangian
F ¼uðcÞ þ 1 ðkÞhðn1Þ þ vðd1Þþ ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ
þ  nðkÞyþ s nðkÞðcþ kÞ  1 ðkÞd1  ðkÞd2 :
The optimization is with respect to c, di, and k, where nðkÞ is given by (8).
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
@F
@c
¼ u0ðcÞ  nðkÞ ¼ 0; ð10Þ
@F
@d1
¼ 1 ðkÞ½v0ðd1Þ   ¼ 0; ð11Þ
@F
@d2
¼ ðkÞ½v0ðd2Þ   ¼ 0; ð12Þ
@F
@k
¼0ðkÞ hðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ½ 
þ  ðy c kÞððn2  n1Þ0ðkÞ  nðkÞ þ ðd1  d2Þ0ðkÞ½ :
ð13Þ
It immediately follows from Equations (11) to (12) that d1¼ d2¼ d so
that the first-best outcome entails full insurance. It also follows from these





This corresponds to Equation (7) under the within-family pension scheme.
It tells us that c and di’s are chosen to set the marginal rate of substitution
between d and c equal to their relative ‘marginal costs’.
Next, substituting d for d1 and d2, u
0(c) for nðkÞ from (10), and v0(d) for
 from (11) or (12), in (13) and rearranging the terms, we have
0ðkÞ½hðn2Þ  hðn1Þ
u0ðcÞ ¼ 1
0ðkÞv0ðdÞðn2  n1Þðy c kÞ
u0ðcÞ : ð15Þ
This corresponds to Equation (6) under the within-family pension scheme.
As in that equation, the left-hand side of (15) indicates the marginal rate of
substitution between k and c. The right-hand side reflects the net cost of
increasing k. The first term (one) is the private cost of k (in terms of c). The
second term indicates the net effect of increasing k on the economy’s
resources. This is a gain to the society through the positive impact of k
on nðkÞ.
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3.1 Decentralization
Equation (15) indicates that in order to decentralize the first-best alloca-
tion, k must be subsidized at the rate of
 ¼ 
0ðkÞv0ðdÞðn2  n1Þðy c kÞ
u0ðcÞ : ð16Þ
In addition to , first-best implementation requires a tax on the young
equal to
T ¼ y c k;
and a pension to the old given by
P ¼ d s:
To see this, consider the economic decision of a young individual facing T,
P, and  while choosing c, k, and di to maximize (1).
12 In so doing, he faces
two constraints: the budget constraint when young, cþ (1 )k¼ yT,
and the budget constraint when old, d1¼ d2¼Pþ s. His choice of c and k
is thus determined through the Lagrangian
I ¼uðcÞ þ vðsþ PÞ þ 1 ðkÞhðn1Þ þ ðkÞhðn2Þ
þ y T c ð1 Þk:
The first-order conditions of this problem yield precisely the first-best
allocation characterized by Equations (10)–(13).
We summarize our results on characterization and implementation of
the first-best allocation as
Proposition 3 The first-best allocation is characterized by d1¼ d2¼ d,
v0ðdÞ=u0ðcÞ ¼ 1=nðkÞ, and Equations (9) and (15). It can be ‘decentralized’
via taxing the young by T¼ y c (1 )k, giving all retired people the
same PAYGO pension P¼ d s, and subsidizing k at the rate of13
 ¼ 0ðkÞðn2  n1Þ P
n2ðkÞ :
That k must be subsidized reflects the positive externality that one’s
expenditure of k bestows on other people through increasing nðkÞ. This
is in line with the literature cited above.
12 Clearly, if there were educational costs proportional to ni, T would be fertility related.
13 Substitute 1=nðkÞ for v0(d)/u0(c) from (14), ðd sÞ=nðkÞ for y c k from (9), and P for
d s, in (16).
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4 Second best
The first-best characterization, and the properties of the accompanying
PAYGO pension plan, rest on the assumption that the government can
control k fully—either directly or through taxation (subsidization in this
case). This will be the case if k (and c) are publicly observable. When the
observability assumption is not satisfied, we will be in a second-best envir-
onment. Under this circumstance, the full insurance prescriptions of a
first-best world may not hold.
To examine this question, assume that k and c are not publicly observ-
able but ni’s are. Policy instruments now consist only of T and Pi’s which
may vary with one’s number of children. First-period consumption con-
tinues to be determined by (4) while second-period consumptions is
given by
di ¼ sþ Pi: ð17Þ
Consider first the young’s problem of choosing k when facing the policy
instruments T, P1, and P2. Maximization of (1) subject to (4) and (17), for
given T, P1, and P2, yields the following first-order condition
14
0ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ
u0ðcÞ ¼ 1: ð18Þ
Equation (18) is identical to (6) under the within-family pension
scheme (although under that scheme, one’s choice of k has purely private
effects). It replaces (15) under the first best. The left-hand side can
again be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between k
and c. However, unlike the first best, this is set equal to one. The choice
of k is thus no longer optimal. Indeed, to the extent that k must be sub-
sidized in the first best, one would expect the second-best solution to result
in a less than optimal value for k. We will show below that this is, in fact,
the case.
Let ekðT; d1; d2) denote the solution to Equation (18), with c and
di’s being given by (4) and (17). This solution describes all possible
values of k that the government can induce through its choice of T, P1,
and P2. The following lemma establishes the comparative static properties
of ekðT;P1; P2). They will prove useful in studying the government’s
problem.
14 The second-order condition is that ðd2U=dk2Þjk¼ ~k < 0. We prove in the Appendix A that
this inequality holds.
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Lemma 1 Let ekðT;P1; P2) denote the solution for k in the problem of















ðÞ > 0: ð21Þ
The inequality signs are as expected. An increase in first-period taxes
reduces net income and with it the young’s expenditure on k (as well as c).
An increase in P1 reduces the attractiveness of k (puts a lower weight on
(k) in the utility function). In consequence, the expenditure on k falls.
Finally, an increase in P2 will have an exactly opposite effect on k and
leads to its going up.
To write the second-best problem, one must restrict the tax instruments
to include only T, P1, and P2 ( is no longer available), and impose the
constraint k ¼ ekðT;P1; P2) on the government’s problem. With a current
young population of one and a current old population of 1=nðkÞ, the
government’s budget constraint is
nðkÞ1 ðkÞT1 þ ðkÞT2 ¼ 1 ðkÞP1 þ ðkÞP2: ð22Þ
The second-best problem is then summarized by the Lagrangian
S ¼uðcÞ þ 1 ðkÞhðn1Þ þ vðd1Þþ ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ
þ nðkÞT 1 ðkÞP1  ðkÞP2 þ ekðT;P1;P2Þ  k:
The first-order conditions are
@S
@T
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@S
@k
¼ u0ðcÞ þ 0ðkÞ
n
hðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ
þ ðn2  n1ÞTþ P1  P2
o
  ¼ 0:
ð26Þ
To determine the properties of the second-best solution, we must first
determine the sign of , the Lagrange multiplier associated with the con-
straint k ¼ ekðT;P1; P2). A positive (negative)  tells us that the second-
best value of k is less (greater) than its first-best value. Simplifying (26),
using the young’s first-order condition (18), we have
 ¼ 0ðkÞðn2  n1ÞTþ P1  P2: ð27Þ
We show in the Appendix A that  is necessarily positive so that the
second-best value of k is less than optimal.
We will then also have, from (20) and (24 ) that v0(d1)>0, and from
(21) and (25) that v0(d2)<0. The concavity of v(.) then implies d2> d1
and in consequence P2>P1.
We summarize these conclusions as
Proposition 4 The second-best allocation under a PAYGO public pension
system implies that the value of k is necessarily less than its first-best value,
and that d2> d1. Consequently, P2>P1: pensions are linked positively to
the number of children.
It is also interesting to observe, from manipulating first-order conditions
(23)–(25), that













Equation (28) corresponds to Equation (7) under the within-family
pension scheme and replaces Equation (14) under first best. The left-
hand side denotes the marginal rate of substitution between di and c.
This was set equal to 1=nðkÞ, their relative ‘marginal costs’, under first
best. This will not be the case under second best. Now with >0 we
have, from (28), 




Recall that the above appears as an equality in the first best.
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5 The traditional PAYGO pension plan
We now turn our attention to the traditional PAYGO pension plans.
Under the traditional system, the pensions of the old are invariant to
the number of children. That is, all retired persons receive the same pen-
sion P1¼P2¼P so that there is full insurance with respect to the second-
period consumption.
The individual’s problem yields the ‘simplified’ (as compared with the
second best) first-order condition15
0ðkÞhðn2Þ  hðn1Þ
u0ðcÞ ¼ 1; ð29Þ
replacing (18). The marginal rate of substitution between k and c is again
set equal to one and differs from its optimal level.
To determine the government solution under this system, we must
impose the additional restriction P1¼P2 on our second-best problem.
This is summarized by the Lagrangian
T ¼uðcÞ þ 1 ðkÞ½hðn1Þ þ vðd1Þ þ ðkÞ½hðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ þ  nðkÞT½
 1 ðkÞP1  ðkÞP2 þ ekðT;P1;P2Þ  kþ ðP1  P2Þ:
The first-order conditions are similar to those under second best. They are
not repeated here and instead are given in the Appendix A. Manipulating
these conditions yields two interesting properties.
First, as with the second-best solution,  is positive here.16 This tells us
that the resulting value of k under the traditional pension plan is, as with
the second best, less than its first best value. Put differently, k is subopti-
mal whether P1 and P2 are restricted to be equal or are chosen optimally.
If k is observable, we can subsidize it and attain first best. Given that the
first-best allocation requires P1¼P2, imposing this as a restriction will
have no impact.
On the other hand, if k is publicly unobservable and cannot be subsi-
dized, the restriction P1¼P2 is binding. In fact, we show in the Appendix
A that >0. This means that increasing P2 and reducing P1 from P is
welfare improving. We summarize these results as
Proposition 5 Under the traditional PAYGO public pension system, k is
suboptimal. If k is publicly observable, subsidizing it will restore first best.
On the other hand, if k is not observable, one can attain the second best by
linking pensions positively to the number of children.
15 Again, the second-order condition is necessarily satisfied here.
16 The expression for  is ¼T0(k)(n2 n1)>0.
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As a final observation, note that corresponding to Equation (14) under










where the inequality sign follows from the fact that @ek=@T < 0 and >0.
Comparison with (14) thus suggests that d is also expected to be less than
optimal.
6 Conclusion
Economists have known for quite sometime now that a PAYGO pension
scheme will suffer if fertility rates decline. A series of papers have recently
argued that fertility is endogenous with an equilibrium that is suboptimal.
The reason for suboptimality is the positive externalities that different sets
of parents bestow on one another when each of them decides to have more
children. The tax revenues that children generate when they grow up are
used to finance the pensions of all retired population. To correct the
externality, these papers have advocated a policy of linking pensions posi-
tively to the parents’ number of children.
The shortcoming of this argument is that fertility cannot be controlled
fully. There is always an element of randomness in the number of children
that parents actually end up with. Subjecting parents to the risks that they
cannot control may very well be undesirable.
This article has shown that if the parents’ efforts in having and raising
children are publicly observable, a policy of linking pensions to the
number of children is misguided. All retired persons should receive the
same pensions regardless of their number of children. The corrective
policy here is one of subsidizing parents’ investment in their children.
On the other hand, when investment is unobservable and one cannot
subsidize it, the full insurance property goes away. In this case, pensions
must be linked positively to the number of children.
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Appendix A




¼ u0ðcÞ þ 0ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ ¼ 0; ðA1Þ
@2U
@k2
¼ u00ðcÞ þ 00ðkÞhðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ: ðA2Þ
Equation (A1) yields the first-order condition given in the text.








The concavity of u(.) and (.) imply that the expressions in the right-hand
side of (A3) are negative.
Proof of >0. We have, from (24) to (25),
ð1 ðkÞÞ½v0ðd1Þ   ¼  @
ek
@P1




Now assume <0. It follows from the above equations and (20)–(21)
that v0(d1)<0 and v0(d2)>0 so that v0(d2)> v0(d1) and
d2< d1)P2<P1. Substituting in (27) then implies >0, which is a
contradiction.
The traditional PAYGO plan
(i) First-order conditions are as follows:
@T
@T1






¼ ð1 ðkÞÞ½v0ðd1Þ   þ  @
ek
@d1
þ  ¼ 0; ðA5Þ
@T
@d2
¼ ðkÞ½v0ðd2Þ   þ  @
ek
@d2
  ¼ 0; ðA6Þ




¼ u0ðcÞ þ 0ðkÞ hðn2Þ þ vðd2Þ  hðn1Þ  vðd1Þ

þ ðn2  n1ÞTþ d1  d2g   ¼ 0:
ðA7Þ







To prove (A8), just substitute from (20) to (21) while noting d1¼ d2.












This, via (A8) implies v0(d)¼. Substituting in (A6) yields:
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